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Introduction
Conflict tends to be understood as a negative phenomenon associated with 
violence. However, it can also be understood as a multidimensional, natural 
phenomenon which usually indicates the occurrence of changes within a given 
society. In this sense, the processes of peace making and peace building will 
focus basically on the prevention of violent conflict, or the need to strengthen 
structures and mechanisms within society, which allow for a constructive han-
dling of controversies aiming for a long-lasting peace between all actors involved 
in the conflict (Africa Peace Forum , 2004). 
Conflicts occur when two or more actors believe their interests are incom-
patible, engage in hostile activities or act towards affecting the other actor’s 
ability to achieve its goals. Conflicts become violent when the actors involved 
do not wish to satisfy their interests peacefully and, instead, engage in different 
forms of violence (Africa Peace Forum , 2004).
It is important to state that violent conflict is not inevitable nor does it happen 
overnight (Africa Peace Forum , 2004). Conflicts are dynamic processes which 
can take different forms and go through a large number of escalation and de-
escalation stages. In fact, according to conflict theory, violent conflict is nothing 
more than a stage in the dynamic cycle of conflict (Faundes, 2005: 7). However, 
this cycle is not symmetric as escalating periods can last for decades – such as 
the Apartheid years in South Africa or the war in Colombia – while de-escalating 
phases may last only a couple of years –usually referring to cease-fires, negotia-
tions and peace agreements. 
Colombia has been suffering from an ongoing violent conflict that has 
threatened both its national security and the security of its people for the past 
four decades. Also, after the end of the conflicts in Peru, El Salvador, Nicaragua 
and Guatemala, the war in Colombia became a major threat to regional security 
in the Americas and the most serious foreign and security policy crisis in the 
Western Hemisphere (Martin, 2001). 
During the past ten years, the confrontation between the two guerrilla 
movements – FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN (Na-
tional Liberation Army)–, the Paramilitaries and the Colombian Armed Forces has 
caused more than 300 thousand killings, 30 thousand kidnappings and more 
than one million internally displaced people. Attempting to define the current 
situation in Colombia as a civil war, a drug war or just terrorism would very likely 
lead to inaccurate results. Instead, a combination of all of the above descriptions 
would probably be more concise and allow for a better understanding of the 
reality of the Colombian conflict. However, if trying to come to terms with the 
nature of the conflict were not difficult enough, finding the best way to solve it 
is even more of a challenge (Delgado, 2002). 
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Confronted by conflicts either within their own territories or at their borders, 
African countries have had to face the need to develop mechanisms which en-
able them to achieve a sustainable and long-lasting peace. Therefore, out of 
the five continents, Africa has become – especially during the XX century – the 
scenario for the vast majority of conflict resolution experiences in the world 
and a region which must be taken into account when trying to address similar 
problems in other areas of the world.
Thus, the study of conflict resolution experiences and post-conflict rec-
onciliation in Africa becomes of crucial importance for a country at war like 
Colombia. An analysis of these processes may turn them into a valid point of 
reference, as it allows for a better understanding of their experiences and serves 
as a guide for the peace process in Colombia.
The New Concept of “Security”
Nowadays, security is not only about defending national borders. The concept of 
“security” itself has been re-defined by the effects of the international globalised 
post- Cold War system and must be understood in a much wider sense. At this 
point, “Human Security” arises as a new definition of security: “[T]he security of 
individuals, not states, should be the main reference for security, and […] this 
would entail the provision of health, welfare, educational, and other services, 
as well as the provision of physical security” (Field, 2004: 30). From a different 
point of view, the Canadian Government describes Human Security as:  
“[A commitment] to building a world where people can live in freedom from 
fear of threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking and the illicit trade of small 
arms. This new generation of threats shows no respect for national borders 
and inevitably becomes the source of our own insecurity. Human Security is a 
people-centred approach to [public and foreign] policy which recognizes that 
lasting stability cannot be achieved until people are protected from violent threats 
to their rights, safety or lives” (Canadian Human Security Programme, 2005).
Within this theoretical framework, it can be argued that without security, 
there cannot be peace or development. The opposite is equally true, without 
peace and development, there cannot be security. Many countries in Africa, as 
well as Colombia, have had many difficulties in achieving and maintaining peace, 
even after a cease fire. Therefore, one of the priorities when trying to reach and 
maintain a peace accord must be the re-establishment of a secure environment 
for the entire population, both in the cities as well as in the countryside. 
Due to the fact that the individual becomes the centre point of this new 
definition of security, a new set of measures has to be undertaken by any gov-
ernment wishing to end a period of violent conflict; those are: (1) controlling the 
trafficking of small arms; (2) eradicating land mines; (3) creating de-mobilisation 
programmes for ex-combatants and their families; (4) assisting refugees and 
internally displaced persons who wish to return to their former lands; (5) judging 
those who committed serious violations to human rights and the international 
humanitarian law during the war period; (6) launching disarmament programmes; 
amongst others. The goal is, therefore, achieving a real national reconciliation 
not only by guaranteeing the security of the population, but also by involving 
the civil society as a whole in the process.
In compliance with the trends in conflict resolution during the Nineties and 
the first years of the 21st century, the Colombian government recognised the 
importance of justice in the process of achieving national reconciliation. That is, 
developing a legal and institutional framework which allows the country to apply 
justice to those who committed crimes during the conflict period. Nevertheless, 
it is important to remember that in war-torn societies the final objective cannot 
be the mere application of justice, but instead, using this justice as a tool to 
achieve a long-lasting national reconciliation.
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Transitional Justice: an instrument for Peace
Justice has been used everywhere in the world as a tool to guarantee that its 
people comply with the different laws of their countries. Whether they are effec-
tive or not, judicial systems aim to enforce the law and punish those individuals 
who commit crimes either against the population or the State. Therefore, justice 
is used as the normal tool available to all states to guarantee an institutional 
order within their borders.
However, there are some periods of time when political and/or social 
turmoil can create particular conditions in a given country where the rule of law 
cannot be enforced by the State and its forces. These circumstances can often 
be seen as a state of conflict and generate, therefore, a stage of “exceptionality” 
within the country’s borders. At this point, judging those who committed crimes 
is important, but achieving national reconciliation must be the main objective. 
Thus, keeping in mind that oftentimes, ordinary justice is not designed to promote 
national reconciliation but, instead, to judge crime perpetrators, a special legal 
regime must be developed in order to facilitate the elimination of the unrest and 
allow the country to go back to non-conflict dynamics. 
Transitional Justice can, then, be the tool through which that special 
legal regime can be developed. It enables the State to create a special judicial 
framework that takes care of those who committed crimes during the excep-
tional period but, also, allows for a different way of handling these criminals as 
it considers amnesty and forgiveness for certain special cases. Transitional 
Justice can be regarded as a different judicial regime, parallel to ordinary justice, 
which is based on the premises of restoration and reconciliation as the ways to 
national reconciliation, and is only applicable to exceptional periods of extreme 
alterations to the national order and severe violations of human rights and the 
international humanitarian law.
When a conflict takes place, peace building instruments such as Transition-
al Justice acquire an exceptional importance in achieving a long-lasting peace 
and a successful construction of a new society. As stated by Lloyd Axworthy 
–Former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade–:
“Peace-building cast[s] a lifeline to foundering societies struggling to end 
the cycle of violence, restore civility and get back on their feet. After the fighting 
has stopped and the immediate humanitarian needs have been addressed, there 
exists a brief critical period when a country sits balanced on a fulcrum. Tilted 
the wrong way, it retreats back into conflict. But with the right help, delivered 
during the brief, critical window of opportunity, it will move towards peace and 
stability” (Aning, 2004: 12).
Due to the exceptional nature of Transitional Justice, a few important char-
acteristics must be taken into account at this point. First, it is not permanent. The 
period of time when Transitional Justice can be used has to be clearly specified; 
that is, establishing the starting and finishing points between which the political 
and/or social turmoil took place. Second, it must not be applied everywhere. 
Spatiality is then a key issue as it has to be determined where the State is go-
ing to apply Transitional Justice. It can be implemented in the whole country, 
in a certain region or, when international initiatives are being undertaken, it can 
include the territories of neighbouring countries or the whole of the international 
community. More about the spatiality of Transitional Justice will be discussed 
in the following paragraphs.
There are two different ways of applying Transitional Justice in a war-torn 
society: (1) punitive justice; and (2) restorative justice. Even though these options 
respond to the need of establishing the best way to achieve a long standing peace, 
their objectives are still the same: national reconstruction and reconciliation.
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Punitive Justice
Punitive Transitional Justice becomes a viable option when the ordinary national 
justice system has collapsed or is unable to guarantee the neutral and impar-
tial delivery of justice in the country. It aims to restore the victims through the 
punishment of those who committed serious crimes against humanity and the 
international humanitarian law, or those who planned, ordered, encouraged or 
helped in the process of committing them. 
Usually, this type of justice is delivered by International Criminal Tribunals 
or Courts such as the ones established in Yugoslavia, Rwanda or Sierra Leone; 
however, national initiatives have also been or are being developed in countries 
such as East Timor, Cambodia or Afghanistan. 
One of the main advantages of Punitive Transitional Justice is that it can 
be used at any point in the conflict cycle once violence has started. That is, 
for example, perpetrators can be punished either while a genocide is being 
committed or after the slaughter has taken place. According to Michael Lund’s 
curve of conflict, the punishment of criminals may start in the war stage where 
armed conflict is the way adopted by the actors to solve their disputes and can 
continue all the way to the peace building stage, where a peace agreement has 
been signed and the objective is national reconciliation. In Graphic 1, this period 
of time can be found between the two purple crosses. 
Since Punitive Transitional Justice initiatives usually come from the international 
community and not from within the country, a common question that may arise 
is: “isn’t International Justice a threat to State sovereignty?” It can be argued 
that indeed it is, but at the same time, it is important to take into consideration 
that in a war-torn society, one of the major challenges faced by governments is 
how to eliminate impunity within their territories; and since the national justice 
system is unable to do so, accepting the help of the international community 
might become a valid choice.
Another key issue is that, by judging criminals, Punitive Transitional Justice 
prevents the community to take justice into their own hands and, therefore, ag-
gravate violence in the country. When the population realizes that perpetrators are 
Graphic 1
Michael lund’s curve of conflict
Source: Author’s Design. Basic graphic at the United States Institute of Peace website:  
<www.usip.org/training/analysis/graphics>
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prosecuted and imprisoned, the perception of security in the country will arise and 
the possibilities of eliminating the turmoil and restoring rule of law become consider-
ably higher. At the same time, when criminals are removed from the population, the 
society can start a new process of national reconciliation and reconstruction.
The previous paragraphs have only discussed International Punitive Tran-
sitional Justice, leaving national initiatives aside. However, if a country plans to 
use this tool on a national level, two points must be taken into consideration. 
First, a long time must go by before a national tribunal can address the serious 
violations of human rights committed during the exceptional period and the in-
ternational humanitarian law. That is so because the justice system must regain 
credibility within the population, since the State is often seen as the one to blame 
for the crimes committed in the past. Cambodia can be cited as an example of 
this situation. The government is currently creating a national tribunal which will 
restore individuals and the society as a whole by prosecuting criminals during 
the Khmer Rouge government of Pol Pot.
And second, if a national punitive transitional justice initiative is to be 
developed during or just after the hostilities, the government must make sure 
that it does not become a revenge tool. Allowing a transitional justice system 
to separate itself from proportionality and neutrality will only make the situation 
worse and the chances of increasing violence or going back to a war stage 
would be extremely high.
Restorative Justice
Restorative Transitional Justice differs highly from the punitive one as it aims 
for the reconciliation of the whole society, not by imprisoning criminals but by 
including them in the new dynamics of non-conflict in the country. It emphasises 
the need to rebuild social relations within the community and does not believe 
that punishment is the best way to achieve this objective.
Restorative Justice also includes new concepts not considered in the 
punitive approach, such as establishing the truth, granting amnesty, forgive-
ness and the reparation of victims. Because of that, restorative justice cannot 
be used during the conflict and is limited to the post-conflict stage, that is, after 
a cease fire has been reached and violence is no longer present in the society. 
Again, looking at Michael Lund’s curve of conflict, restorative justice can be 
used between the two purple crosses in Graphic 2: 
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But why can it not be applied during the conflict? For example, since knowing 
the truth about the crimes committed during the violent period is one of the key 
premises of restorative justice; if a combatant demobilises during the conflict 
and decides to tell the truth about a certain massacre, that information may 
be used by the government to judge other combatants who might have been 
involved in the same massacre and who have not demobilised. Also, because 
proofs are being given to the government, non-demobilised combatants might 
go after the one who told the truth and killed him for betraying the rebel group. 
Thus, the importance of establishing dynamics of non-conflict in the country 
before restorative transitional justice can be used is clearly stated.
After the breaking point in which a country goes from being in conflict 
to going back to peace, the government may chose to use the tools available 
under restorative transitional justice, but it is important to mention that it is the 
population itself who should forgive criminals. Forgiveness cannot be imposed 
on people; therefore, a national campaign targeting the population is needed 
if the government wants people to acknowledge that, at this point, the priority 
must be national reconciliation and not personal revenge. 
Also, it is crucial that the initiatives and leadership come from within the 
country as this is a process that requires support from all social, economic, politi-
cal, cultural and religious groups. If one of these groups does not work towards 
national reconciliation, restorative transitional justice will not work in the country. 
Likewise, if initiatives come from outside the country, foreign help might be useful, 
but if the whole process is being imposed by the international community, it is 
bound to fail because it will not include those who do need to forgive.
Amongst the various goals that restorative transitional justice aims to 
achieve are:
To achieve the final resolution of the conflict, not through punishing 1. 
but, instead, through the joint participation of all the actors involved 
in the conflict, including the civil society.
To alleviate the victims’ pain through knowing the truth. That 2. 
incorporates a public forgiveness for those who committed crimes 
during the conflict and allows society to know what really happened 
Graphic 2
Michael lund’s curve of conflict
Source: Author’s Design. Basic graphic at the United States Institute of Peace website:  
<www.usip.org/training/analysis/graphics>
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during that period. That way, in exchange for finding out the truth, 
the victims forgive those who attacked them. Also, it is important 
that perpetrators include all relevant information in their confessions, 
such as why, how, when, and where people were murdered, where 
the weapons are, where the corpses are, etcetera. Finally, a certain 
amount of money may be paid to the victims as a way to restore 
them and alleviate their suffering. 
To prevent future aggressions in the country basing the whole process 3. 
in the building of a new State, one with stronger institutions and an 
effective rule of the law for all citizens everywhere in the territory.
The instruments commonly used by governments to implement restorative 
transitional justice are Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, a body created 
temporarily to investigate and clarify what really happened in the country during 
the violent stage. The Commissions are non-judicial organs, therefore, instead of 
punishing,, they produce a final report which contains all the perpetrators’ testi-
monies and some key recommendations for a lasting national reconciliation. 
The different tasks that a Commission should fulfil include: (1) identifying 
the real causes of violence and the actors involved; (2) giving society accurate 
information about human rights violations in the country; (3) giving the victims 
a space where they can share their traumas, stories and experiences; (4) of-
ficially recognising crimes; (5) making recommendations with respect to the 
best way of preventing future violence, how to undertake an institutional reform, 
strengthen the judicial system and guarantee the protection of human rights 
and the international humanitarian law; and (6) granting amnesties and official 
forgiveness to perpetrators while victims are restored.
One of the most remarkable examples of Restorative Transitional Justice 
was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. This organ was 
responsible for creating a new society for all South Africans after the Apartheid 
regime was dismantled. The Commission became a space where blacks and 
whites could share their experiences as equals in a country where equality had 
not been present since the first years of the twentieth century. 
Finally, a major role has to be played by a leader who should pave the way 
to national reconciliation. Without a leader, the process is bound to fail. He must 
focus all his efforts in preventing personal revenges, guiding the whole society 
to a new phase of non-conflict and being an example of honesty, clarity and 
forgiveness for the people.
Two Roads, the Same Objective: the Cases of Rwanda and South Africa
Rwanda and South Africa have probably become the most important examples 
of Transitional Justice in Africa. The first one used a punitive approach to rebuild 
the State after the genocide in 1994. The second, on the contrary, followed the 
path of restorative justice to facilitate the transition from the Apartheid regime 
to democracy, also in 1994. 
Rwanda is an interesting example of the costs of assuming a policy based 
only on the application of Punitive Transitional Justice. In theory, at least, an 
International Court might have been the only way to overcome impunity in the 
country and guarantee a trial for genocide perpetrators. However, in practice, 
the incapacity of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to effec-
tively administer justice in the whole territory, as well as the lack of the financial 
resources needed for the Tribunal to be successful, meant that the ICTR could 
not fulfil its mandate, and it is said to be a major and expensive failure. “By early 
2002, with 800 employees and after having spent approximately USD 540 mil-
lion, it had handed down eight convictions and one acquittal, with seven trials 
for seventeen accused in progress, two appeals pending, and fifty-five suspects 
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in the tribunal’s custody” (Uvin and Mironko, 2003:220), rather small numbers 
compared to the approximately one million people killed during the three months 
of the genocide in 1994.
As a consequence of the low efficiency of the ICTR, Rwandese population 
started seeing this organ as a:
“blatantly biased and evil institution […]. It is seen as de facto, if not by 
design, supporting the current government by neglecting its crimes, by a priori 
accepting the existence of the genocide, by allowing shoddy legal procedures, by 
submitting too much to the pressures of the Rwandan government, by refusing 
to indict President Kagame and other Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) members, 
and so forth. In short, in this opinion, the ICTR is a deliberate farce that maintains 
an oppressive regime and silences the violence of which the Hutu were victims. 
This vociferously articulated position is held mainly by people living outside of 
Rwanda, but there is no reason to assume that it is not shared by at least part 
of the population” (Uvin and Mironko, 2003:222). 
In effect, the inefficiency of the ICTR deepened the resentments between 
Hutus and Tutsis, and thus, troubled even more a true national reconciliation 
in Rwanda. 
Due to the failure of the western proposal for transitional justice in Rwanda, Ga-
caca Tribunals were created by civil society as a local initiative which aimed at:
“establishing the truth about the genocide by compiling a list of perpetra-
tors, victims, and damages in every jurisdiction; and to reconcile and promote 
unity among Rwandans by public acknowledgment of guilt and innocence. These 
aims represent a dramatic rethinking of the functions of justice in a post-conflict 
society, stressing community participation to over legal procedure and adding 
to degree of restorative justice” (Uvin and Mironko, 2003:226).
The Rwandese experience clearly shows that the legal framework for 
Punitive Transitional Justice may indeed give the required tools to achieve a long-
lasting national reconciliation; however, if its implementation lacks political will or 
the necessary funds, it will contribute to the failure of the whole process. In this 
particular case, both problems were present; on one side, the ICTR was unwill-
ing and unable to prosecute all the perpetrators, especially those with French 
and Belgian citizenships, and, on the other, the Rwandan government was not 
capable to afford the costs not covered by the international community. 
As for South Africa, the chosen tool to create a new South African State 
was Restorative Transitional Justice. The government of the African National 
Congress (ANC) led by peace Nobel Prize winner Nelson Mandela acknowl-
edged that the only way to effectively eliminate the political and economic con-
sequences of Apartheid was through a joint effort of all South Africans working 
towards some common objectives: knowing the truth, building a new State, 
and putting the nation’s interests over particular ones. 
In words of Archbishop Desmond Tutu: “Restorative Justice does not 
have anything to do with revenge or punishment, but with the establishments 
of bridges and the reconstruction of imbalances and social relations highly af-
fected by the conflict, in an effort to restore aggressors as well as the victims” 
(ALAADA, 2005: 2).
For South Africa, Restorative Transitional Justice meant that perpetrators 
of serious crimes against humanity would voluntarily go to the audiences and 
tell the truth about what really happened and how it happened to the govern-
ment and the victims, and then apply for forgiveness on an individual basis, 
creating, thus, a social and moral reconnection in society as a way to overcome 
the painful past. Also, those aggressors who did not submit to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission were prosecuted and judged by the ordinary justice 
and imprisoned when applicable.
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Another important issue in South Africa was political determination and 
leadership in the process. Whether it was because Apartheid was no longer 
sustainable in terms of economic development, or because of strong ideals of 
democracy, liberty and justice for all in a united South Africa, key leaders such 
as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, President Frederick DeKlerk or Nelson Mandela 
guided the negotiations, urged the people to participate in the process and led 
the reconciliation stage. Without them and their political will, the democratic 
transition in South Africa would have never been possible.
The Colombian Experience: what NOT to do with Transitional Justice
“If peace was possible in South Africa, it can also be possible in Colombia. It 
can be possible everywhere. But, if you want to end war and violence in your 
country, you have to sit down and negotiate. Keep in mind that there is no need 
to negotiate with friends. We must negotiate with our enemies, with those who 
we hate because conflicts occur after a disagreement” (Tutu, 2005).
In 2005, and ignoring Archbishop Tutu’s words in Cali, the Colombian Gov-
ernment continued its so-called peace process with the paramilitaries, leaving 
the FARC and the ELN –the most important guerrilla groups in the country and 
definitely key actors in the conflict –out of the negotiations. That itself constitutes 
a reason for the whole process to fail. 
At the same time, and to complement the peace process, a bill passed 
in Congress aimed to create a restorative transitional justice legal framework 
to facilitate the demobilisation of combatants and national reconciliation. The 
first draft of this bill included concepts such as truth, justice, reparation and 
reconciliation, that is, it considered the most important elements of restorative 
transitional justice. However, after deliberations, the final law that came out of 
Congress was called “Law for Justice and Peace” (Law 995, 2005) and it ignored 
three out of the four concepts mentioned before. 
Within this legal framework and a peace process that excluded two of the main 
actors, let us go a bit deeper into the Colombian conflict resolution experience.
First: the political leadership of President Álvaro Uribe has been focused 
not on national reconciliation but, instead, on the escalation of the war. He deeply 
believes that he can win the war against the insurgent groups and, at the same, 
talk about peace with the paramilitaries. Accordingly, most of his efforts have been 
focused on strengthening his Democratic Security, a policy that aims at restoring 
security everywhere in the country, but with an extremely high military component 
and no real conflict resolution foundations.
Second; in Colombia, and opposed to the Transitional Justice principles 
and the South African experience, peace initiatives have been limited exclusively 
to a few of the illegal groups and the government. The civil population has not 
been involved in any of the different stages in the process nor has it had the 
opportunity to know what is being negotiated and what the effects of those 
negotiations are going to be. Subsequently, it has been the government who 
has granted amnesties and forgiveness forgetting that it is the population who 
has to forgive. In fact, if the people do not wish to forgive criminals, the whole 
process is bound to have a major fail.
Third: according to Restorative Transitional Justice, if a person that has 
committed crimes against human rights and the international humanitarian law 
does not wish to be judged and imprisoned, there is a need for him or her to 
give something back to society as a form or restoration. In South Africa, per-
petrators told the truth to the government and the society in order to obtain 
forgiveness, and that was one of the key elements which made the whole pro-
cess successful. In Colombia, on the contrary, amnesties and forgiveness to 
demobilised combatants are granted without them having to give anything in 
return. There is no real mechanism to guarantee that those who acted against 
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society effectively restore their victims in pro of a new society, based on repara-
tion and reconciliation.
As an example, in February 2006, 20,134 paramilitaries demobilised in Santa 
Rosa del Sur, a small town in southern Bolívar (El Tiempo, 2005). The government 
granted them all the necessary benefits for them to withdraw from the armed 
groups, including a monthly allowance of approximately USD 220 for two years, 
without confessing their crimes. Thus, the victims did not have the opportunity 
to know the truth. Therefore, without truth there is no forgiveness, and without 
forgiveness, there is no reconciliation… And the cycle of violence keeps going
Fourth: as explained before, restorative justice requires a cease fire involving 
all actors in the conflict before the exceptional legal framework can start being 
implemented. In Colombia, the so-called peace process has taken place in a 
context where neither the paramilitaries nor the guerrillas have committed to a 
cease fire. Therefore, it would be interesting to wonder if it is possible to talk about 
peace and reconciliation when you are still killing Colombians every day.
Finally, and probably one of the most important issues to be taken into 
account: if you want to solve a conflict, you at least have to acknowledge that 
it indeed exists. President Álvaro Uribe has made it clear on a large number 
of occasions, during the past four years, that in Colombia there is no internal 
conflict but instead, a terrorist threat. That basically means that his government 
is negotiating with terrorists, and also, that the international community cannot 
really help in the process solving the conflict in the country, basically because 
there is not one.
South-South Cooperation: Africa, a new point of reference
Historically, for Colombian governments, international cooperation for conflict 
resolution has been understood in economic terms. However, it might be the 
time to start thinking that sometimes, money is not everything and relevant 
knowledge coming from other countries that went through similar situations 
might be more important. Africa becomes, then, a valid point of reference as it 
would allow Colombian decision makers to get in contact with foreign experi-
ences that can be adapted to our own national situation. 
The South African attempt to contribute with its experiences in order to 
facilitate the Colombian conflict resolution process is a clear example of this 
South-South Cooperation. Between February 9th and 12th, 2005, the Pontificia 
Universidad Javeriana organised the International Symposium for Restorative 
Justice and Peace in Colombia which took place in Cali. Among the various 
speakers, some key South African leaders and experts in conflict resolution were 
invited to participate: Archbishop Desmond Tutu –Peace Nobel Prize winner in 
1984–, Tokyo Sexwale –former governor of the Province of Gauteng–, and Albie 
Sachs –member of the Constitutional Court of South Africa–, amongst others.
The main objectives of this Symposium were to generate a sense of con-
sciousness in the general public and the public sector about the importance of 
implementing the concepts and procedures of Restorative Transitional Justice, to 
promote a bill that creates the necessary legal framework, and, in general, to learn 
from foreign experiences and train Colombians in issues of Restorative Justice.
During his intervention at the Symposium, Archbishop Tutu emphasised 
the need for the Colombian government to include the FARC and the ELN in 
the peace talks as the only way for hostilities to end. Also, he made the South 
African territory available for real and serious negotiations between all actors in 
the conflict, offered Nelson Mandela’s mediation and facilitation in the process 
and mentioned South Africa was willing to share all its experiences and informa-
tion with the Colombian government, in order to finally reach a peace agreement 
(Simposio Internacional Justicia Restaurativa y Paz en Colombia , 2006).
15OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
To this offer, President Álvaro Uribe responded that this solution was not 
viable because, while the guerrilla and paramilitary leaders were at the negoti-
ating table in South Africa, other members of these organisations would keep 
on killing, burying land mines, kidnapping and trafficking with arms and drugs. 
After this statement, Tutu continued saying to Uribe that the situation becomes 
even more problematic when no real acts of leadership are undertaken and 
that, he, as the president of Colombia should take advantage of his position to 
lead the way to national reconciliation. As stated by Nelson Mandela, he said, 
“No one but a Colombian who has a plan and a deep love for his country can 
end this conflict” (ALAADA, 2005:3). A major opportunity to negotiate a peace 
agreement had been lost.
Final Considerations
Transitional Justice has proved to be effective as a peace building element in 
various areas of the world. For Colombia, there is no point in making the same 
mistakes made in other countries because we neither want to learn what they 
did and how they did it, nor hear what they have to say. Some African nations, 
as well as other countries in the Americas, Europe and Asia have made them-
selves available to mediate and facilitate our own peace process, but all the 
government is interested in is financial support. 
It is true that solving the problem will not be possible until Colombians take 
on a more important role in the country’s life and put pressure on the govern-
ment and the rebel groups to negotiate. However, it is also true that international 
guidance might become crucial in the process, and the absence of it would 
only make things much more difficult for us. 
If the Colombian Government is worried about war instead of peace, and 
the society is not really taking part in the negotiations, the outcome of the peace 
talks will be no other than the increase of violence to such an extent that the 
conflict becomes unbearable; in other words, the conflict will not be solved until 
the point in which the benefits of peace are greater than those of war. However, 
it is the Colombian civil population who has to bare the costs of new violence 
outbreaks in the country; therefore, for Colombia, peace is not only a right, it is 
a must because the millions of victims demand it.
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